The balanced-budget amendment unrealistic

President Reagan has made enactment of a constitutionalamendment mandating a balanced budget the cornerstone of his EconomicBill of Rights, a strategy for getting the nation's fiscal house inorder. The amendment was one of five major goals he mentioned in hisaddress to the nation last week.

It seems to us that the president has less chance of realizingthat goal than any of the others. And for good reason: It is totallyunrealistic.

It is also the most expendable, rating in importance far belowMr. Reagan's other objectives - two arms-control agreements with theSoviet Union on intermediate-range and intercontinental missiles, apeaceful settlement of the conflict in Central America and filling aSupreme Court vacancy.

Polls show about 80 percent of Americans favor the idea ofchiseling into our basic national charter an amendment to prohibitbudget deficits except in time of extreme peril. The amendmentsupposedly would prevent the national government from increasing thedeficit by jacking up appropriations when necessary to stimulate astagnated economy, and it supposedly would prevent the waivers thatCongress routinely votes itself to circumvent laws aimed atirresponsible spending practices.

The amendment would not only be useless, but also a monstrousdeception. It would make it appear that the president and Congresswere doing something about balancing the budget and reducing thedeficit instead of continuing to blame each other for keeping thebudget in imbalance.

Neither Mr. Reagan, with his zeal for a continued costly militarybuildup, nor Congress, with its refusal to exercise self-disciplinein spending on domestic programs and pork, can escape blame.Together, their actions promise no solution to the problem. They arethe problem.

Much debate presumes the major role to be the president's. Thatcertainly is true as far as presenting a blueprint for annualspending, the best analysis of any administration's priorities. Butno spending can take place without congressional setting of spendinglevels, and while a president can veto over-all spending bills, hecannot trim them or be selective on items within a massiveappropriation. (We do agree with Mr. Reagan and most previouspresidents that a line-item veto - which Congress refuses to give tothe presidency - would be highly desirable.)

As a concept, presidential responsibility for putting together afull federal budget is relatively new. Congress jealously guardedits constitutional authority for appropriations (with the implicitauthority for budget-making) for most of the republic's twocenturies. William H. Taft was the first president to present draftlegislation to Congress, but it was not until Woodrow Wilson thatpresidents began presenting bills to Congress in person.

Even when Herbert Hoover addressed the Senate on a revenue billin the depths of the Depression, he was bitterly criticized fortrespassing on congressional turf during debate on a pending moneyitem.

The rapid growth of defense spending beginning with World War IIforced the White House, because of its pre-eminent role in foreignpolicy, to assume an increasing role in the budgetary process. As itexists today, the process resembles a tandem act between the twobranches of government. When spending gets out of control, and whenthe two branches don't agree on where and how much to cut, eachblames the other. Public exasperation with the process has reached anew height during the Reagan presidency.

Congress already ignores a budget act that makes it illegal tooutspend revenue in any fiscal year. Why would a balanced-budgetamendment force compliance? It cannot resolve the conflict. Onlyre-ordered priorities - or adoption of the same priorities betweenthe president and Congress - can overcome the problem.